EM Fingerprints: Attack In-Display Fingerprint Sensors via Electromagnetic (EM) Side Channel

Recently, in-display fingerprint sensors have been widely adopted in newly-released smartphones. However, we find this new technique can leak information about the user’s fingerprints during a screen-unlocking process via the electromagnetic (EM) side channel that can be exploited for fingerprint recovery. We propose FPLogger to demonstrate the feasibility of this novel side-channel attack. Specifically, it leverages the emitted EM emanations whe the user presses the in-display fingerprint sensor to extract fingerprint information, then maps the captured EM signals to fingerprint images and develops 3D fingerprint pieces to spoof and unlock the smartphones.

Paper Cite

@inproceedings{ni2023recovering,
    title={Recovering Fingerprints from In-Display Fingerprint Sensors via Electromagnetic Side Channel},
    author={Ni, Tao and Zhang, Xiaokuan and Zhao, Qingchuan},
    booktitle={Proceedings of the 2023 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security},
    pages={253--267},
    year={2023}
}

Recent News


Demo of Attacks

Attack OnePlus 10 Pro

Attack Redmi K20 Pro



Ethical Consideration

We take ethical considerations seriously. Since fingerprints are very sensitive biometric information, illegally collecting from human participants may cause severe consequences and violate laws. Therefore, as a proof-of-concept work, we construct 3D fingerprints from real fingerprint images through 3D printing technique. All fingerprint pieces are built via a 3D printer using fingerprint images from a public dataset for scientific research (SOCOFing), and these pieces are only used for fingerprint registration and unlocking the smartphone to collect EM emanations for empirical evaluations.

Public Fingerprint Dataset SOCOFing

Sokoto Coventry Fingerprint Dataset (SOCOFing) is a biometric fingerprint database designed for academic research purposes. SOCOFing contains 6,000 fingerprint images from 600 African subjects and contains unique attributes such as labels for gender, hand and finger name as well as synthetically altered versions with three different levels of alteration for obliteration, central rotation, and z-cut.

Appendix A - Notations in ASE Feature Extraction

Notation Description Setting
f Sampling frequency 20kHz
rf Resolution of target fingerprint images 64dpi
i, j Starting and ending indices of a signal frame 0, 1, 2, ...
e i,j(t) Envelope data between i and j at time t i+0.001f=j
eL i, j(t) and eU i, j(t) Lower bound and upper bound of e i, j(t) i+0.001f=j
eF i, j(t) Extracted ase feature from e i, j(t) i+0.001f=j
nF and lF Segments and length of the moving binning window -, 0.002

Appendix B - Smartphones with In-Display Fingerprint Sensors

Commodity Smartphone Optical-based Ultrasonic-based
OnePlus 10 Pro
OPPO A96
Xiaomi Redmi K20 Pro
Huawei P30 Pro
OnePlus Nord 2T
Realme GT 2 Pro 5G
OPPO Reno 8 Pro
Google Pixel 6a
Vivo V25 Pro 5G
Moto G72
Honor Magic 2
Meizu 16 Plus
Huawei Mate 20 Pro
Vivo V11 Pro
Lenovo Z5 Pro
OPPO R17 Neo
Google Pixel 7 Pro
Samsung Galaxy S10
Samsung Galaxy S22
iQOO 9 Pro

Appendix C - Comparison Table

Relevant side-channel attacks on different smartphone unlocking systems. FPLogger is the first work to attack in-display fingerprint sensors in newly-released smartphones.

Attack Unlocking System Side Channel
Charger-Surfing   Numeric passcode Charging current
Periscope   Numeric passcode EM emanations
WindTalker   Numeric passcode RF (Wi-Fi) signals
KeyListener   Alphabetic passwords Acoustic
EM-Surfing   Numeric/Alphabetic passwords EM-induced voltages
WISERS   Numeric/Alphabetic passwords EM perturbations
Ye et al.   Pattern lock Camera-based
PatternListener   Pattern lock Acoustic
Dong et al.   Face recognition Camera-based
Erdogmus et al.   Face recognition Camera-based
Sharif et al.   Face recognition Camera-based
Yang et al.   Face recognition Camera-based
Zhong et al.   Face recognition Camera-based
FPLogger (Our work) In-display fingerprints EM emanations